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Bigger Isn't Always Better
Ryan Krainz ‘18
Knowing that the long herky-jerky 
left-handed swing that would miss on a 
fastball then come back with the occasional 
4-3 groundout was valued at $184 million 
was hard to watch. Does frustration settle 
in when $23 million a year gets a return 
of a 1.5 WAR or a .230 BA? I’m sure this 
wasn’t what Theo Epstein had in mind ei­
ther when he inked Jason Heyward for 8 
years. No team is perfect and Heyward is 
still very young, only 27, and has 7 more 
years to prove his worth. This is by no 
means a knock on Heyward, but rather the 
concept of the ‘mega-contracts’ that MLB 
clubs hand out to players.
Even though Major League Baseball 
does not have a hard salary cap, such as the 
NHL, teams still face payroll constraints. 
Now this varies completely depending on if 
you’re in a small market, such as the Tampa 
Bay Rays, or a large one like the New York 
Yankees. Regardless, no matter the team 
or market, baseball is a business and teams 
want the most from their players. Whether 
that means production from young control­
lable players who come in to the spotlight 
and perform in the likes of a Kris Bryant 
or Francisco Lindor, or the heavily paid 
free agent such as Robison Cano or Alex
Rodriguez. No matter the market, it hurts a 
club a lot more when a player with a large 
contract is not performing.
For instance, take the infamous New 
York Yankees, a team that is always in the 
top 3 for payroll salary. The Yankees, be­
ing notorious for paying star-studded free 
agents lots of money, went on a spending 
spree during the 2007 and 2008 off-sea­
sons. According to Baseball Reference, 
they re-signed Alex Rodriguez for 10 years 
at $275 million, the highest salary in MLB 
history at the time.1 CC Sabathia was the 
next target as they scooped him from free 
agency with an offer of 7 years for $ 161 
million? Mark Teixeira then signed an 
8-year deal worth $180 million.3 There is 
no question that these players were very 
talented and maybe worth the money at 
the time. However, “A-Rod” would be 41 
when his contract expired, Sabathia 37, and 
Teixeira 36. Professional athletes tend not 
to perform better with age.
Once again, the talent was there and 
these players produced early in their con­
tracts. According to Baseball Reference, 
Rodriguez was the AL MVP in 2007 and 
finished in the top 10 for the 2008 and 2009 
MVP voting. He had a respective WAR of 
7, 4.7, and 2.3 during those years? Teixeira 
was second in AL MVP voting during his 
first year as a Yankee in 2009 and finished
in the top 20 for voting during his 2010 
and 2011 seasons. Teixeira posted WAR’s 
of 2.9, 1.7, 1, and 1.9 during his first four 
years in Pinstripes.5 Sabathia is no differ­
ent, as during his first four years as a Yan­
kee he finished in the top four for Cy Young 
voting three separate times, top 15 for MVP 
voting twice, and was a three-time All-
"There is no doubt that 
these players produced in 
their prime; however, the 
long contract signings allow 
players like these three to 
age out of their prime and 
become a liability rather 
than an asset."
Star/1 These three stars helped the Yankees 
to a World Series ring in 2009. There is no 
doubt that these players produced in their 
prime; however, the long contract signings 
allow players like these three to age out of 
their prime and become a liability rather 
than an asset.
Since 2012, Rodriguez posted the fol­
lowing WARs: 0.3, -0.3, 0.9, and -2.0, per 
Baseball Reference. He batted .272, .244, 
.250, and .200 during those years.7 Ro­
driguez retired a year early to serve in an 
advisory role in which the club will still 
have to pay him $21 million for his final 
year on his 10-year contract. Teixeira re­
corded WARs of -0.4, -0.8, 2.2, and -2.1 
during those years. His batting averages 
since 2012 were as follows, .151, .216, 
.255, and .204.8 Sabathia posted WARs of 
1.7, -1.6, -1, and -0.5. His ERA since 2012 
has been 3.38, 4.78, 5.28, and 4.73? Ro­
driguez, Teixeira, and Sabathia all faced a 
significant decline in the last half of their 
contracts. As a result, the Yankees haven’t 
played in a playoff series since 2012, the 
same year the decline for these players hit.
Lets take a look at some other big free 
agent singings, as I am not just picking 
on the Yankees. The Angels signed Albert 
Pujols in the winter of 2011 for 10 years 
and $240 million. Once again, there is no
Rodriguez, Sabathia, Derek Jeter, and Teixiera formed the core of the once-formidable Yankees.
Photo courtesy ofZimbio.com
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The Ang les hoped that Albert Pujols w ould bring his MVP-caliber production to Anaheim.
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doubting the talent of Albert Pujols as he 
posted WARs of 7.3, 7.6, 5.5, and 3.3 in his 
years leading up to signing with the An­
gels. In his first year as an Angel, he posted 
a WAR of 2.4, since then he has had WARs 
of 0.0, 1.5, 0.8, and -0.8.10 The Angles still 
have five more seasons with Pujols and 
when his contract expires in 2021, he will 
be 41 years old." This was another sign­
ing that added a very talented player but 
is head-scratching for the amount of years 
and money given.
Over the past 3 years there have been 
mega-contracts given to the following 
players: Jason Heyward, Jon Lester, Rob­
inson Cano, Max Scherzer, and Giancarlo 
Stanton, just to name a few. While it is still 
too early to analyze the following sign­
ings, it would be naive to ignore the past 
ones. All of the aforementioned players are 
signed for at least 6 years and will be well 
into their 30s when the contracts expire, 
barring an opt-out.
There is no question that the game is 
moving toward a different direction with 
the abundance of young talent that results 
in great production such as Mookie Bet­
ts, Mike Trout, and Bryce Harper. Serious 
money is going to be thrown around with a 
huge free agent class ready to hit the market 
in the fall of 2018 as the names of Mach­
ado, Donaldson, Harper, and Kershaw (if 
he opts out) look to sign mega-contracts. 
Pujols, Rodriguez, Teixeira, and Sabathia 
were all at the same point in their careers. 
A team will have no interest in having one 
of these superstars depreciate in their fi­
nal half of a multi-million dollar contract. 
A shorter offer, say 3,4, or maybe 5 years 
with an above average market price seems 
more feasible. Instead of offering a player 
$20 million annually for 10 years, an offer 
above the market price, say $25-27 million 
instead of 20 million might catch their at­
tention.
Some teams have started to do this al­
ready; the Mets signed Cespedes this winter 
for 4 years at $110 million ($27.5 million 
yearly), the Dodgers singed Justin Turner 
for $64 million which extends 4 years, and 
the Cardinals signed Dexter Fowler for 5 
years at $82.5 million. The shorter con­
tract allows a team to have flexibility and 
move on from a signing if it doesn’t pan 
out rather than being stuck in turmoil like 
the Yankees were with Rodriguez, Teixeira, 
and Sabathia.
However, are these massive contracts
inevitable? With high talent creating a high 
market for the MLB, these mega-contracts 
may become impossible to avoid. If one 
team is unwilling to offer a huge contract 
it always seems as if another team is. With 
Pujols, the Cardinals weren’t willing to of­
fer a large contract but the Angels were. To 
avoid these mega-contracts it would take 
all 30 clubs, which is just not feasible. It 
becomes a case that is easier said than done.
Practically speaking, a player who is 
young and of All-Star talent is looking for 
some security and probably won’t accept a 
shorter contract. In my mind, if they pro­
duce they deserved to be paid. I also believe 
that a long-term contract of over 7 years 
is very risky for any team and is not the 
smartest investment especially in the last 
half of their contract. Professional athletes 
tend not to get better with age and these 
long contracts allow players to produce for 
a couple of years and then age out of their 
prime while still clogging up the payroll. 
The Yankees haven’t played in a playoff se­
ries in over 4 seasons because of depleted 
talented. These mega-contracts will not go 
away any time soon but your team might 
not be playing in October either.
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From Tiger to Rory:
Nike is Moving on in Many Big Ways
Tiger Woods and Rory Mcllroy sporting Nike athletic wear on the course.
Photo courtesy of Getty Images.
Bradley Wright ‘18
Phil Mickelson once regarded that “he 
hates that I can fly it past him now [off 
the tee]. He has a faster swing speed than
I do, but he has inferior equipment. Tiger 
is the only player who is good enough to 
overcome the equipment he’s stuck with.”* 1 
Rather than thinking that Nike was helping 
Tiger dominate the field, many believed 
that Tiger was winning despite Nike. This 
image only worsened over time, highlight­
ed when Rory Mcllroy infamously admit­
ted the switch to Nike negatively affected 
his golf game in 2013. Rory had always 
played Titleist clubs, a brand known for 
high quality, but never really paying its 
athletes very much. When Tiger switched 
from Titleist to Nike, he was even able to 
play a Scotty Cameron putter (produced 
by Titleist) that he used until eventually 
switching in 2010. After the switch, Tiger 
went from being one of the best putters on 
tour to one of the worst. He was second on 
tour in strokes gained putting in 2009, but 
fell outside the top 100 in 2010 and 2011,
and was outside the top 30 in 2012.
In tenns of what makes Nike equipment 
subpar, there are many theories as to why 
they failed, but I believe it is because Nike 
invested too much in marketing and design 
and not in quality. Their clubs often have a 
smaller “sweet spot”, and become harder to 
hit, but are often the most stylish clubs on 
the market. Aside from equipment, many 
people have worn Nike golf clothes, and its 
clothing line has been steadily improving. 
So, with negative brand imagery regarding 
equipment and a market that was quickly 
moving past it, Nike used the two things it 
had left to make a major change in the golf 
industry: brand loyalty and money. Nike 
wisely left the golf equipment business this 
year, but decided to go all in on the clothing 
sector.
Before delving into whether or not this 
was a smart move, it is important to note 
that this move could not have been done 
without Nike originally making equip­
ment. Although other players like Antho­
ny Kim, Paul Casey, and Rory Mcllroy 
have all helped promote Nike, Tiger is 
what brought Nike into the same conver­
sation as TaylorMade, Titleist, PING and 
Callaway. Perhaps the best PR Nike ever 
received was Tiger’s chip-in on the 16th 
hole of the 2005 Masters. For those of you 
living under a rock, Tiger made an unbe­
lievable chip that stopped just before the 
hole and then fell in. While it was tempo­
rarily stopped, the only visible part of the 
ball was just the Nike Swoosh. Nike even 
had a commercial centered around this 
shot, that said, “We gave you a wedge with 
more feel, you showed us what it could do. 
We gave you a ball with more control, and 
you didn’t center the logo?”. The purpose 
of this anecdote is that many people, (my­
self included) played Nike clubs and Nike 
Golf balls because Tiger did it. For lack of 
a better word, it was cool to play Nike. I’d 
be remised if I failed to mention that the 
first golf club I ever bought was the bright 
yellow Nike SQ driver. I did it because I 
wanted to be like Tiger, and I’m positive I 
wasn’t the only one.
Nike’s big problems began when Tiger’s 
major issues began. Since 2008, Tiger has 
failed to win a major. He has been World 
Number One and won a handful of touma-
6 Sports, Inc.
ments, but majors have eluded him. In 2012, 
Nike signed Rory Mcllroy to pick up where 
Tiger left off. They ran a few commercials 
with the two of them together, with “Rip­
ple” (2015) and “No Cup is Safe”(2013) 
being the two most popular commercials.
"Nike wisely left the golf 
equipment business this 
year, but decided to go all 
in on the clothing sector."
’’Ripple”, was a commercial that showed 
Rory growing up and demonstrated Rory’s 
admiration for Tiger. The commercial was 
very much a passing of the torch, but the 
issue was that, although Rory had a dom­
inant 2014, Jordan Spieth stole his spot­
light in 2015, and Rory had a rocky start to 
2016. In other words, Rory didn’t run with 
the torch the way Nike expected him to. In 
all fairness, it seemed like Nike expected 
Rory to be Tiger, which is too much to ask 
of anyone. Before moving on, I also want 
to make one thing perfectly clear. The rea­
son 1 feel like Nike left the golf equipment 
business is not because Rory failed to run 
with the torch passed from Tiger but be­
cause he failed to win despite Nike in the 
same way that Tiger did. When Rory was 
using Titleist equipment, he was nearly 
impossible to beat when he was playing 
well. I still believe that Rory’s “A-game” is 
better than anyone else’s “A-game”. Since 
Nike has left the golf business, Rory has 
consistently finished inside the top 10. Be­
tween November and March of this past 
year, Rory has won over 11 million dollars 
in prize money and has been in contention 
every single week. The biggest difference 
is that he is now playing TaylorMade clubs 
(another top brand), Titleist golf balls and 
only wearing Nike clothes.
So, in August of this year, Nike stopped 
making golf equipment.2 While many see 
this as a failure, it was extremely smart. 
Nike’s golfers will still wear Nike cloth­
ing, but will no longer have to suffer from 
playing bad equipment. Tiger could use 
Mizuno Irons, and Rory could use a Taylor- 
Made driver, which would be unbelievable 
to see. Rory could even go back to using 
the Titleist clubs he used for so long, and I 
expect to see Tiger putting better with the 
Scotty Cameron that helped him win 13 of 
his 14 majors. With these players now be­
ing able to use better equipment, it is likely 
that they’ll be even more competitive than 
they were before. Additionally, Nike will 
be able to spend more time in clothing and 
apparel, which should help that business 
become even better.
While it is good that Nike’s athletes will 
be playing better and that they’ll be able 
to make better clothes, they can also sign 
athletes to different deals now. Jordan Spi­
eth loves being signed by Under Armour 
because he can still play Titleist clubs, but 
now players can sign apparel deals with 
Nike, and still sign equipment deals with 
other companies. For example, in Septem­
ber, Nike signed the top ranked golfer in 
the world, Jason Day, to an apparel deal,3 
which will only make Nike’s clothing line 
even more visible. So yes, Nike is no lon­
ger making golf equipment, but they will 
still be in golf. They are now a more attrac­
tive brand for players to sign with, and this 
could be a chance for its current players to 
go back to their winning ways. Nike has 
truly made its best decision since signing 
Tiger in 1996. It only took 20 years for 
them to do it.
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The Battle Over Proper Strategy Towards
MLB Roster Construction
Daniel Solomon 419
Michael Lewis’s Moneyball, which exam­
ined the use of “sabermetrics” by the for­
ward-thinking Oakland A’s front office, 
changed the landscape of Major League 
Baseball. It called traditional player eval­
uations into question, and created an entire 
body of baseball fans devoted to convert­
ing the game into one of numbers and al­
gorithms. Now, many organizations treat 
sabermetrics—the application of statisti­
cal analysis to baseball—as a fundamental 
aspect of their baseball operations depart­
ments. While its ultimate goal of finding 
value where others fail to see it is applicable 
to any properly functioning organization, 
it is unclear if the use of sabermetrics is 
creating on-field success stories. By look­
ing at the recent performance of several 
teams, one can assess whether or not Gen­
eral Managers and Presidents of Baseball 
Operations should mold their front offices 
in a traditional fashion—stressing scouting 
observations of players’ physical tools and 
old statistics such as batting average, wins, 
and runs batted in (RBI)—or should adopt 
advanced analytics in order to make better 
baseball decisions.
It is difficult to truly assess the mer­
its of each method when considering the 
immense turnover in baseball operations 
departments in recent seasons— 18 of 30 
General Managers have been hired by their 
current teams as recently as 2014. But a 
2015 ESPN ranking provides a general 
overview of teams that have fully embraced 
the analytics movement compared to those 
that have stuck to traditional scouting as 
their primary method of assessing players.1 
It divided the league into five sections, two 
of which indicated a strong willingness to 
adopt sabermetrics and three which were 
less accepting of the movement. Only 11 of 
30 teams were considered full believers or 
nonbelievers of the movement, with many 
teams falling in hybrid categories. For the 
sake of this article, we are going to focus
on five teams at each end of the sabermet- 
ric spectrum and compare their overall re­
spective performances in terms of regular 
season and postseason records, along with 
success in several offensive and pitching 
categories. According to the “The Great 
Ranking Analysis” conducted by ESPN, 
the Oakland A’s, New York Mets, Chicago 
Cubs, Los Angeles Dodgers, and Houston 
Astros all rank in the upper half of teams in 
terms of their focus on advanced analytics. 
Unsurprisingly, these front offices are com­
posed of people who were either directly 
part of the initial Moneyball movement 
(such as Billy Beane of the A’s and Sandy 
Alderson of the Mets) or others who have 
molded their baseball minds in the wake 
of the Moneyball era, including both Theo 
Epstein of the Cubs and the Dodgers’ An­
drew Friedman. Contrarily, teams such as 
the San Francisco Giants, Detroit Tigers, 
Texas Rangers, Arizona Diamondbacks, 
and Atlanta Braves all place near the bot­
tom of ESPN’s rankings. For the most part, 
the recent management for each of these 
teams has emphasized traditional scout­
ing over modem statistics when evaluating 
players, often comprising their front offic­
es with former players and scouting direc­
tors (because Mike Hazen, a Theo Epstein 
protege, took over control of the Diamond- 
backs only in October 2016, their recent 
transactions will not be considered).2,3
When looking at the overall perfor­
mance of the above teams over the past five 
seasons, the traditional teams have “out- 
won” the sabermetric contingent by over 
two wins a season, yet have made the post­
season on one fewer occasion. Addition­
ally, the sabermetric teams have won two 
more postseason games overall but won 
one fewer championship. However, the is­
sue with evaluating teams purely based on 
regular season records and postseason per­
formances is that they fail to account for 
team rebuilds and the inherent randomness 
of the postseason tournament. Specifically, 
the Atlanta Braves tore down their roster 
prior to the 2015 season, and the Cubs and
Astros endured intense remakes during the 
first few years of the Theo Epstein and Jeff 
Luhnow regimes, respectively. The teams 
studied have endured varied success. The 
traditional Giants, for instance, have won 
two championships in the past five seasons 
with just one 90-win season in that span. 
Meanwhile, the sabermetric Dodgers have 
won an average of 91 games—by far the 
most of any team in this study—yet they’ve 
failed to achieve the same postseason suc­
cess of the Giants, Cubs, or Mets, teams 
that have been objectively inferior over the 
past five years both offensively and on the 
mound.
The traditional teams have out-scored 
the sabermetrics group. This seems coun­
terintuitive on the surface, as sabermetri- 
cians tend to believe that their evaluation 
will lead to more overall run scoring. Spe­
cifically, they value a player’s ability to get 
on base (OBP) and hit the ball out of the 
ball park (HR) as two fundamental aspects 
of run production, while devaluing tradi­
tional stats such as RBIs and batting aver­
age. And while OBP and HRs are important 
in any circle, diminishing batting average 
may have a greater overall impact on run
"While its ultimate goal of 
finding value where others 
fail to see it is applicable to 
any properly functioning 
organization, it is unclear 
if the use of sabermetrics 
is creating on-field success 
stories."
production than generally theorized by the 
Society for American Baseball Research 
(SABR) community. The sabermetric ori­
ented teams batted .014 below non-saber- 
metric teams. While this is not bad in iso­
lation, this contributed to an OBP that was 
nine points lower than their adversaries
8 Sports, Inc.
and they scored 29 fewer runs per season. 
While there is logic to constructing a roster 
that gets on base at a high rate and has pow­
er, removing contact hitters and speedsters 
from the equation may make an offense 
function worse, as it fails to capitalize on 
poor defenses and other random occurrenc­
es that can only happen when the ball is put 
in play. Therefore, a team like the Giants, 
who hit the fewest homeruns, on average, 
of any team in the study, was still able to 
score more runs per year than all but one 
sabermetric team. Conversely, the best in­
dividual run scoring seasons were held by 
teams of both factions, with both the Cubs 
and the Rangers maxing out at 808 runs 
scored in 2016 and 2012, respectively. And 
these teams took very different approach­
es to scoring these runs. The Cubs walked 
nearly 200 times more than the Rangers, 
yet hit 13 fewer extra base hits and stole 25 
fewer bases while hitting for a significantly 
lower batting average (.256 as opposed to 
.273).45 Though both strategies can work, 
the traditional evaluations seem to have led 
to more consistent offensive production 
over the past five seasons.
The sabermetric teams outperformed 
the traditional teams in every pitching cat­
egory. This is undoubtedly enhanced by 
the elite rotations assembled by the Mets, 
Dodgers, and Cubs in recent seasons, along 
with the declines of once dominant Giant 
and Tiger pitching staffs. But it ultimately 
comes down to the greater success of the 
sabermetric community in stressing the 
role of elite relief pitching beyond the clos­
er. Brian Kenny, author of “Ahead of the 
Curve” and an analyst for MLB Network, 
has stated that the next big thing in baseball 
is the “full bullpen attack.” He suggests 
to forgo the classic starting pitcher and 
instead have a “guy go two innings, [an­
other] guy goes one, [and a third] guy goes 
three. Why are we running this guy out for 
six innings until he’s exhausted and gives 
up three runs?”6 In 2016, the Cubs traded 
away their best prospect for half a season 
of Aroldis Chapman when they already 
had an established closer on their roster. 
This put an elite reliever, Hector Rondon, 
in a non-closing role and ultimate helped 
the Cubs win a World Series title.7 The As­
tros signed both Luke Gregerson and Pat 
Neshek to augment their bullpen in the 
2014-2015 offseason,8 and then gave up a 
bounty of five players (including a former 
number one overall draft pick, Mark Appel
and current rising star Vincent Velasquez) 
for closer Ken Giles the following year.9 
The sabermetric teams also construct their 
pitching staffs with a greater number of 
strikeout pitchers, with all of the top three 
strikeout per nine rates coming from sa­
ber-minded teams.
And while the SABR community’s em­
phasis on strikeouts and more frequent use 
of relief pitching probably plays a large role 
in their teams’ pitching dominance, other 
aspects of sabermetric analysis realistically 
play an even greater role. Specifically, the 
community emphasizes defensive metrics 
that provide a greater total assessment of 
players than evaluating just based on the 
eye-test and on generic errors. This has led 
to more balanced rosters that, though unable 
to score at the same rate as the traditional 
teams, can provide value on both sides of 
the ball. Notable are the Cubs’ and Dodg­
ers’ acquisitions of Jason Heyward and 
Yasmani Grandal, respectively. Heyward is 
a defense-first outfielder with just one sea­
son of over 20 homeruns and zero 100 RBI 
seasons.10 But Heyward has posted positive 
defensive statistics each year he’s been in 
the majors, with three gold glove awards
Photo courtesy of Sports Illustrated.
to validate his defensive prowess.11 And 
though Grandal has failed to post a batting 
average above .234 since 2012, he is re­
garded as one of the best pitch framers in 
the league (pitch framing is when a catch­
er convinces an umpire that a borderline 
pitch is a strike).12 According to Baseball 
Prospectus, Grandal was the second-best 
pitch framer in baseball in 2016, and was 
credited with saving the Dodgers nearly 
52 runs just from his framing.13 And while 
sabermetric-oriented teams round out their 
rosters with overall productive players, tra­
ditional teams such as the Diamondbacks 
and Braves have countered with acquiring 
players such as Yasmany Tomas and Matt 
Kemp, respectively. Tomas is essentially 
position-less and would be a designated 
hitter if on an American League team, and 
Kemp has failed to produce a positive de­
fensive WAR (wins above a replacement 
player) since 2008.14 Thus, while the teams’ 
rotations and bullpens will inherently vary 
in quality, the surrounding pieces are also 
large factors in evaluating the overall ap­
proach to designing a pitching staff.
Ultimately, looking at each tactic in 
isolation fails to provide a full portrait of
Spring 2017 9
the happenings on the diamond. The teams 
were nearly even in the categorical assess­
ment conducted (the sabermetric teams 
“won” 8 of 14 categories). But in order to 
properly construct a Major League team, 
front offices must rely on both mathe­
matical data and traditional scouting. The 
Giants did not win two world champions 
in the past five years and three in the past 
seven years by accident. Their method of 
scouting and development has produced a 
legacy of winning that tops anyone since 
the Yankee dynasty of the late 1990s. But 
the Oakland A’s method of advanced ana­
lytical assessments has also helped one of 
the poorest franchises in sports experience 
three years of great success in a five-year 
stretch, until it was inevitably forced to tear 
down the roster before it became too ex­
pensive to maintain. And though the Giants 
admit to “putting] the numbers secondary 
to the player,”15 there are many who would 
argue that the team has put its faith in ad­
vanced analytics, notably by deploying a 
tracker which allows them to measure a 
defensive player’s reaction time to a hit 
ball.16 Despite their classifications, most 
teams have ultimately utilized both philos­
ophies when constructing their rosters. And 
beyond the different methods of player as­
sessment, teams must have the financial 
resources to maintain a nucleus of great 
players as defined by either method and 
the foresight to continue to plan for expect­
ed declines in player production. There is 
room for both in the game. And both need 
to play roles in the decision-making pro­
cesses of a front office in order to achieve 
the optimal outcome on the field.
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Politics in Sports:
NBA as a Social Liberalism Pioneer
NBA superstars Carmelo Anthony, Chris Paul, Dw yane Wade, and LeBron James, w ho opened up the 2016 ESPY's with a powerful address
on the topics of racial divisiveness, police brutality, and steps for social progress.
Photo courtesy of ABC News.
Harrison Marcus ‘20
There has been a rich history of Americans 
valuing the separation of sports and poli­
tics. For centuries, athletes would strive 
to maintain the pure, natural form of ath­
letic performance, eradicating any of the 
commercial or political aspects of sporting 
events. In the postwar era this has certainly 
changed, as evident by the breakthrough of 
Jackie Robinson for the African-American 
community, the role of diplomacy and Cold 
War politics in many of the mid-late 20th 
century Olympic Games, and the rise of 
athletes as political symbols. In a culture 
where sports and politics are increasingly 
intertwined, the NBA has built a reputa­
tion the past few years as the most social­
ly liberal professional sports organization. 
Both its progressive business strategies and 
liberal-minded, outspoken athletes have 
shaped the democratic reputation of the 
NBA brand. The most recent presidential 
campaign season also brought out the lib­
eral nature of the league’s players, coaches, 
and owners, with many dominant figures 
publicly showing support for the Dem­
ocratic party. The NBA is of course built 
around the game of basketball, but its so­
cial efforts, democratic policies, and polit­
ical impact shape the league just as much 
as the skill of its players. A Stephen Curry
three-pointer on the basketball court holds 
the same significance on the hardwood as 
a public outcry against President Donald 
Trump’s policies do in the political sphere.
A monumental aspect of the NBA’s lib­
eral culture has been its acceptance of the 
LGBT community. When Jason Collins be­
came the first openly gay athlete to play in 
a North American professional sports game 
three years ago, the NBA embraced his 
presence proudly. Just after he first signed 
with the Brooklyn Nets in 2014, his jersey 
was the top seller at the NBA store.1 Col­
lins drew praise from not only fellow NBA 
players, coaches, and league officials, but 
he also caught the attention of the White 
House. Former President Barack Obama 
and former First Lady Michelle Obama -  
both of whom belong to the Democratic 
party - embraced Collins as a fixture for 
the democratic platform and a role mod­
el to all. Collins’ unprecedented decision 
to notify the world of his sexuality while 
still an active player was a courageous act 
that has influenced many people. In fact, he 
appeared on the cover of Time Magazine’s 
“ 100 Most Influential People in the World” 
in April of2014.2 His presence in the NBA 
has been crucial to the league’s progressive 
and accepting nature, helping modernize 
the social views and values of the league. 
The fact that North America’s first openly 
gay professional athlete played in the NBA
is both monumental and unsurprising.
More recently, Adam Silver embarked 
upon a major decision that has once again 
showed the NBA’s public support for the 
LGBT community. The 2017 NBA All-Star 
Game, which just took place at Smoothie 
King Center in New Orleans, Louisiana, 
was originally scheduled to be played at the 
Spectrum Center in Charlotte, North Caro­
lina. However, after the controversial HB2 
“bathroom bill,” which prohibits transgen­
der persons from choosing the bathroom 
they feel most comfortable in, commission­
er Adam Silver decided to move the game 
and the weekend festivities out of North 
Carolina.3 This was a powerful decision 
that truly shows the political influence of 
the NBA’s top executives. Silver has been 
dedicated towards stimulating the inclusive 
culture of the league, as proven through the 
switching of venues for this past February’s 
All-Star Weekend.
Aside from a commitment to the LGBT 
community, the NBA has also taken a pow­
erful stance on the police brutality and rac­
ism that has stirred up controversy in the 
United States the past few years. In 2014, 
an African-American male by the name of 
Eric Gamer was brutally choked to death 
by white police officers despite constantly 
saying “I can’t breathe,” to the officers.4 
This was viewed as a racist crime that 
drew widespread national attention. As
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a sign of protest against police brutality, 
many NBA players wore warmup shirts 
before games that relayed his message of 
“I Can’t Breathe” on their chests. It was a 
commanding message to American society 
that as a predominantly African-American 
league, the NBA and its players will not 
tolerate racial violence and will actively 
protest against it.
During this past summer, the tragic 
deaths of Alton Sterling and Philando Cas- 
tille, both of whom were fatally shot by po­
lice officers, triggered social unrest across 
the country. America was in an unsettling 
place, with racism, divisiveness, and vio­
lence dominating the news for a few weeks 
in July. The country was in need of change, 
acceptance, and a vision towards equal­
ity. Recognizing their roles in American 
society as influential role models, NBA 
superstars LeBron James, Dwyane Wade, 
Chris Paul, and Carmelo Anthony kicked 
off the 2016 ESPY’s with a dark yet inspi­
rational message. They emphasized both 
the need for change as well as the severity 
of gun violence and racial divisiveness in 
the United States. Four of the NBA’s most 
influential and popular players used bas­
ketball as a platform for a broader social 
message, striving to help the country put an 
end to gun violence and racial profiling. At 
an event where athletes of all sports were 
brought together, NFL, MLB, and NHL 
players weren’t the ones delivering this 
message to the American public. It was 
NBA players who were taking responsibil­
ity to initiate change and serve as leaders 
to a nation in desperate need of guidance 
and unity.
James, Wade, Paul, and Anthony’s mes­
sage triggered a series of actions by prom­
inent players and teams across the league. 
Anthony in particular became a pioneer for 
social activism. He organized a town hall 
meeting between his Olympic teammates, 
teenagers of minority descents, and police 
officers to discuss the issues at the forefront 
of American society and possible change 
to resolve them. Similarly, the Sacramen­
to Kings organized a town hall meeting of 
their own. The Charlotte Hornets owner, 
also referred to as the “GOAT” - Michael 
Jordan - donated $1 million to the Inter­
national Association of Chiefs of Police’s 
New Institute for Community-Police Rela­
tions and $1 million to the NAACP Legal 
Defense Fund. In a statement addressing 
the difficult state of America, Jordan said
that he was “troubled by the deaths of Afri­
can-Americans at the hands of law enforce­
ment and angered by the cowardly and 
hateful targeting and killing of police offi­
cers.”5 This past summer was an unsettling 
stretch of time for everyone who identifies 
as an American, and the NBA prioritized its 
role as a leader for change. They tackled 
the issues head on, and as an organization 
the NBA promoted valuable dialogue to 
stimulate progress.
With regard to the recent presidential 
election, many iconic NBA figures have 
passionately spoke out against President 
Donald Trump and his proposed policies. 
Head coaches Steve Kerr, Stan Van Gun­
dy, and Gregg Popovich were among those 
who have publicly expressed their resent­
ment for then-candidate Trump. They fre­
quently criticized the travel ban and the in­
famous wall, preaching for inclusivity and 
acceptance. Popovich in particular did not 
hold back on his views of Donald Trump, 
telling reporters in one of his multiple po­
litical rants to the media, “We’re watch­
ing him be misogynistic and xenophobic 
and racist and make fun of handicapped 
people.”6 Steve Kerr told the media after 
Trump’s immigration ban was first signed, 
“As someone whose family member is a 
victim of terrorism, having lost my father 
[Malcolm Kerr, a university professor, was 
murdered in 1984 in Beirut] if we’re trying 
to combat terrorism by banishing people 
from coming to this country, we’re really 
going against the principles of what this 
country is about and creating fear.”7 Even 
LeBron James formally endorsed Dem­
ocratic nominee Hillary Clinton at one of 
her Ohio rallies alongside teammate J.R. 
Smith. Additionally, Adam Silver, Dallas 
Mavericks owner Mark Cuban, and NBA 
icon Earvin “Magic” Johnson reportedly 
donated a significant amount to Hillary 
Clinton’s campaign.8 Cuban and Johnson in 
particular were very vocal about their dis­
pleasure for Donald Trump’s consequential 
rhetoric and agenda. In perhaps the most 
politically divided campaign season in 
American history, the NBA as a brand let 
it be known which side it stood on. There 
has been a long history of prominent ath­
letic figures keeping their political views to 
themselves due to the fear of losing poten­
tial fans. However this election season was 
unlike any other, and the NBA community 
responded accordingly by speaking out in 
an unprecedented fashion.
Jason Collins, w ho became the first openly  
gay  athlete to play in any of the four major 
North American 
professional sports leagues.
Photo courtesy of SB Nation. 
There are countless other examples that 
highlight the NBA’s democratic culture. 
The league has quickly emerged as a plat­
form for minorities and an organization of 
social acceptance. Its brand is directly as­
sociated with themes of liberalism, social 
activism, and the Democratic party. As the 
business of the NBA continues to flourish, 
its political influence will only continue to 
expand.
Works Cited
1. Matt Moore @MattMooreCBS Feb 26, 2014 •
1 min read. “Jason Collins’jersey skyrockets 
to No. 1 on sales list.” CBSSports.com. N.p.,
02 June 2015.
2. “Jason Collins featured on the cover of Time's
Most Influential People issue.” USA Today. 
Gannett Satellite Information Network, 25 
Apr. 2014.
3. Aschbumer, Steve. “NBA decides to move 2017
All-Star Game from Charlotte.” NBA.com. 
N.p., 21 July 2016.
4. “The Death of Eric Garner.” NBC New York.
N.p., n.d.
5. TheUndefeated. “Michael Jordan: T can no lon­
ger stay silent’.” The Undefeated. The Unde­
feated, 28 Dec. 2016.
6. Lutz, Tom. “Spurs coach Gregg Popovich calls
Donald Trump a bully and praises marches.” 
The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 22 
Jan. 2017.
7. Polacek, Scott. “Steve Kerr Comments on Pres­
ident Donald Trump’s Immigration Ban.” 
Bleacher Report. Bleacher Report, 16 Feb. 
2017.
8. Jon Solomon @JonSolomonCBS. Mar 11,2016
• 6 min read. “These sports figures gave 
money to 2016 presidential candidates.” 
CBSSports.com. N.p., 11 Mar. 2016.
Harrison Marcus is a freshman in the ILR school 
He can be reached at hm395@cornell.edu
12 Sports, Inc.
Show Me the Money:
Incentives and the NFL
Noah Fink ‘19
m  m
It is no secret that the NFL suffered down­
ward trending viewership this past sea­
son, displayed by the recurring theme of 
lackluster Thursday Night Football games 
amplified by lower ratings virtually across 
the board.1 There are multiple variables at 
play in determining what caused this drop­
off, as factors such as attention toward 
a hotly-contested presidential election, 
the ongoing concussion dialogue, and the 
controversial movement started by Col­
in Kaepemick all could have contributed 
to the resulting lower viewership. It even 
could have been just a random statisti­
cal aberration, but it seems that the NFL 
may be in trouble and perhaps has been 
for a short while. While baseball may be 
America’s pastime, football is America’s 
sport and its dominance had been relatively 
unquestioned. That is, until this year. The
Goodell regime has so far weathered the 
somewhat storm of complaints of softening 
the game while taking heat for the undis­
closed effects of head trauma to players as 
well as a host of off-the-field issues some 
NFL players have had such as domestic vi­
olence and driving under the influence.
While not suggesting that such things do 
not happen in other major sports leagues, 
the attention given to the NFL and the 
seemingly endless terrible publicity the 
organization has received in the past few 
years is alarming. In regards to the con­
cussion issue, the death of Junior Seau 
and some of his peers as well as the early 
retirements of players such as Chris Bor­
land have opened the doors for crisis in the 
NFL. With such bad press and an ever-ex­
panding list of injury concerns, football 
has been regarded as a less attractive op­
tion compared to some of its counterparts, 
such as baseball and basketball. By now, 
the mental health concerns can probably be
considered common knowledge, meaning 
that it will be hard to argue a lack of under­
standing from this point forward given the 
attention concussions have garnered in the 
recently. How can youths be encouraged to 
play a sport that could leave them with per­
manent brain damage after a short career 
when the MLB and NBA seem to lead to 
better outcomes in terms of health? With 
that being said, how can the NFL maintain 
or even grow its talent pool? The obvious 
answer is to further incentivize its budding 
participants to weigh the potential benefits 
more heavily than the anticipated risks, but 
more crucially, how could this be done?
Von Miller, arguably the best active de­
fensive player in the NFL, signed a contract 
worth $114.5 million over six years in the 
summer of 2016.2 That number is some­
what deceptive, however, as about 60% 
of that figure is “guaranteed money” that 
Miller will earn, and even the “guaranteed” 
portion of that money comes with complex
Matt Flynn (15) only received around 5 0 %  of what he originally signed for, and Von Miller (foreground) will hope that he doesn't share a
similar fate.
Photo courtesy ofTheNewsTribune.com
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Von Miller received a massive payday, but how much of the $114.5 million he signed for will he 
actually see?
Photo courtesy of The Chicago Tribune
caveats.’ Let’s compare this lucrative con­
tract with that of an MLB player. In De­
cember of 2015, former Braves and Car­
dinals outfielder and Gold Glove winner4 
Jason Heyward signed an eight year, $184 
million deal.5 While not perfectly alike in 
regards to contract details, similar terms 
and player traits make this an appropriate 
comparison. It is clear that in terms of pure 
dollars, years, and annual average sala­
ry, Heyward emerges victorious and by a 
large margin. Even if, hypothetically, Mill­
er earned every dollar he signed for (which 
is not certain), Heyward has still garnered 
more intake, and his contract has ensured 
him of two more years of guaranteed mon­
ey. It is important to note, for the sake of 
this specific comparison and for the overall 
discussion, that Miller is a “one-way” play­
er. He only appears as a member of the de­
fense, and thus is only involved in roughly 
half of the game. While some may argue 
that Heyward is two-way player in name 
but is only an asset defensively in practice, 
he nonetheless is involved in both the of­
fensive and defensive sides of the game. 
With this taken into account, Miller is paid 
less to participate less, thereby his contract 
can be seen as a fair, if not openly bene­
ficial, one. Both players are in their prime 
and this may be the only contract that either 
signs before retirement and they receive 
sizeable sums of money for their craft. But 
in contracts, and specifically those of the 
NFL, the devil is in the details.
The heart of the issue is “guaranteed” 
money. NBA and MLB contracts are fully 
guaranteed in regards to base salaries and 
signing bonuses. The NFL operates with 
a more complex system that allows teams 
to sign a player to a contract, pay for their 
services while they are useful, and cut the 
player when it is strategically and financial­
ly advantageous. The Forbes article “The 
Anatomy of an NFL Player Contract” looks 
at the example of quarterback Matt Flynn’s 
2012 contract. While holding a reported 
value of $19.5 million over three years,
"The NFL operates with 
a more complex system 
that allows teams to sign 
a player to a contract, pay 
for their services while 
they are useful, and cut the 
player when it is 
strategically and financially 
advantageous."
only $10 million of that total was money 
that Flynn was sure to see, parceled out as 
a $2 million base salary for the first two 
years with a $6 million signing bonus.6 A 
year and a half later, Flynn had been traded 
and released, with $9.5 million of the $ 19.5 
million he signed for forever out of his
possession.7 The Seahawks (and then Raid­
ers) doled out funds for him while he was 
of some value to them but when the situa­
tion was in favor of it, he was disposed of 
with no real financial repercussions. This 
structure benefits teams in a sport that is 
infamous for the short-lived careers of its 
players and quick rates of decline among 
former stars as teams can swiftly tear up 
weighty contracts in favor of the next wave 
of players. But if you are a sport that may 
face a labor crisis of sorts, basic economics 
show that when the supply of labor con­
tracts, the price of labor will increase.
This comparison leads to the heart of the 
issue and the factors that hamper a “quick 
fix”. The uniqueness of the NFL is seen 
primarily in the method of play and roster 
construction. While the NBA, MLB, NHL 
et al. still have players who have skill sets 
that reside in some dichotomy of offensive 
and defensive talent, you play with both 
mindsets depending on individual situa­
tions. For Von Miller and company, outside 
of the rare trick-play or desperate need, a 
defensive player rarely participates in of­
fensive situations and vice versa. Football 
even includes the added dimension of “spe­
cial teams” which is valued by coaches as 
a specialized brand of player all by itself. 
This tri-fold division thus results in a size­
able disparity in the number of players on 
a roster. Football sees each of its 32 teams 
carry 53 players on the active roster, while 
the MLB maintains 25-man major league 
rosters and NBA teams carry up to 15.8 To 
purely insist that players be given wealthier 
contracts is thus a difficult suggestion, for 
the NFL would have to manage its funds 
to cover twice as many active profession­
als as MLB teams or nearly four times as 
many active players as NBA teams. While 
the NFL is unquestioningly the most prof­
itable sport overall, its position relative to 
the MLB and NBA9 hinder the argument 
that simply paying all of the players more 
is feasible. At least not in the traditional 
sense.
There are certainly athletes in the NFL 
who successfully play out contracts and 
receive large paydays, but if your sport is 
seeing a growing stigma of the dangers of 
the game, the risks most likely dominate 
the potential rewards. This holds even 
more so when the rewards are as contin­
gent as they are in the NFL. As has been 
stated, doling out larger contracts may not 
be necessarily as easy as it appears, but the
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“It soon may be time for 
the NFL to take an already 
socially contested step: pay 
its athletes even more"
money is already there. It just needs to 
be accessible for players, and this could 
be done through contracts that are fully 
guaranteed. To suggest that the NFL uni­
laterally alter the structure of contracts to 
make them fully guaranteed is not likely 
to happen in any world where the com­
missioner wishes to remain on good terms 
with the teams in the league. It may, how­
ever, serve the NFL well to look to its next 
Collective Bargaining Agreement with the 
NFL Players Association (NFLPA) with 
an open mind should compensation secu­
rity come up as a hot topic.
Suggesting a particular solution as 
beneficial would be ignorant if the po­
tential repercussions were not discussed. 
Fully guaranteed money may well result 
in teams offering contracts with less years 
of pay, and in the NFL, some players may 
not make it past their rookie contracts 
(which are themselves, interestingly, be­
coming more structured and rigid in their 
terms10). Stripping teams of their relative 
power over players, achieved through 
contracts that favor releasing players over 
continued long-term commitments, would 
potentially see a massive backlash from 
owners and GMs. The NFL’s restrictive 
salary cap is conducive to such contracts 
as teams can quickly reduce their payroll 
to get under the cap by cutting expensive 
players who no longer provide a needed 
level of utility while signing other play­
ers to similar deals. These new players 
will most likely be treated similarly two 
or three years down the line, continuing 
the vicious cycle. This somewhat ham­
pers the idea of having fully guaranteed 
contracts, as the money saved by cutting 
players goes back into the investment 
into other players. Perhaps then the NFL 
could look to drastically increase the sal­
ary cap or adopt a similar “luxury tax” 
to that of the NBA or MLB in the hopes 
that it could alleviate teams of the strict 
financial concerns and in turn allow them 
to retain players that have signed sizeable 
contracts. Having to pay more to players 
will never be an attractive option to the 
team owners in the league, but if the NFL 
continues to fall in terms of viewership
and overall popularity, such “unpleasant” 
measures may be necessary and thus, al­
beit coldly, welcomed.
It seems then that the trade-off may 
be more secured money over a shorter 
amount of time. Would it be worth it? 
Considering the Matt Flynn situation, not 
even comparatively short contracts are 
“sure bets” for players, and because of 
that he lost nearly half of the initial value 
he signed for. As mentioned previously, 
it is widely known that NFL players tend 
to have shorter careers and the turnover 
levels for certain positions can be quite 
high. Understandably then, players wish 
to secure as much value as they can in 
their prime, and given that goal it seems 
that this trade-off may be one that is worth 
taking. It would be nearly impossible for 
contract security to spontaneously appear 
in the game of football, but it may be a 
crucial point should the NFL find itself 
at a crossroads with diminished interest 
in the game from both fans and players. 
It soon may be time for the NFL to take 
an already socially contested step: pay 
its athletes even more. Or at least, ensure 
that they are paid in full for the value they 
signed for. And to invoke Tom Cruise’s 
Jerry Maguire, it may just be time to show 
them the money.
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2017 SABR Analytics Conference Retrospective
Matt Vani ‘19
Introduction (Written by Noah Fink) 
Founded in 1971 by a core group of 16 
members, the Society of American Baseball 
Research (SABR)1 would lead a movement 
to research and deepen the understanding 
of the game of baseball. Perhaps its most 
salient contribution has been its role in the 
rise of mathematical analysis and statistics 
in the game of baseball. Their efforts would 
not find immediate popularity; however, as 
a “traditionalist” mindset dominated the 
culture of baseball. Bill James’ work in the 
1970s and 1980s furthered the burgeon­
ing movement,2 but it was Michael Lewis’ 
2003 book Moneyball: The Art of Winning 
an Unfair Game that finally brought the 
use of statistical analysis in baseball to the 
forefront in both the game itself and the 
general public. Statistical metrics, termed 
“sabermetrics” after SABR, continue to be 
a growing aspect of player evaluation and 
the SABR Analytics Conference serves 
as a venue in which new ideas and meth­
odologies are highlighted and discussed. 
This past March, four Comellians traveled 
to Phoenix, AZ to participate in the Con­
ference’s “Diamond Dollars Case”. In this 
spotlight piece, Matt Vani describes the 
event and the team’s project for the SABR 
Conference:
When people think of sports analytics, the 
word moneyball is usually the first thing 
that comes to their mind. The idea of mon­
eyball changed the game of baseball. Many 
people associate moneyball with advanced 
statistics but at the heart of moneyball is 
the idea that certain players in baseball 
have a gap between their perceived value 
and their actual value on a baseball field 
and front offices wanted to take advantage 
of this gap. These players deceived scouts 
for years, as their actual value was much 
higher than what scouts could see from the 
eye test. This idea of deception and value 
gap was a key element to the 2017 SABR 
Analytics Conference Diamond Dollars 
Case Competition.
During the competition, college students
are given a case that involves a baseball op­
erations decision that a major league front 
office may face. This year’s case was a bit 
different from previous years as each team 
was given a set of data and told to create 
their own way to use the data to their ben­
efit. The data set that the teams were giv­
en involved pitch tunneling statistics from 
2008-2016. Pitch tunneling is the art of 
deceiving hitters by having different pitch­
es look the same while in the tunnel when 
the hitter has to decide whether or not so 
swing but then break differently after the 
hitter has decided to swing. In an era where 
pitchers are graded based on how hard they 
throw, tunneling is another way for pitchers 
to gain an edge over hitters without hav­
ing overwhelming velocity. Hall of Famer 
Greg Maddux was known for his ability 
to disguise his pitches and use late break 
to fool hitters. Now thanks to Baseball 
Prospectus we have stats to see how well 
pitchers are able to disguise their pitches.
One of the key applications of this pitch 
tunneling data is to help pitchers optimize 
their pitch sequencing. If a pitcher has great 
tunneling data associated with his fastball 
and slider, it would be beneficial for that 
pitcher to set up his slider with his fastball. 
Many of the teams who participated in the 
competition used the data to analyze pitch 
sequencing. The Cornell team of Skyler 
Kanfer, Kyle Sargent, Nate Buchwald and 
Matt Vani focused specifically on whether 
or not specific teams in 2016 had optimized 
their pitch sequencing in their presentation. 
They analyzed whether or not pitch tun­
neling could help explain why the Cubs 
pitching staff ranked 1st in the league in 
ERA and the Diamondbacks pitching staff 
ranked 30th in the league in ERA.
The team from Elon University that won 
the competition used the tunneling data 
to create a predictive model. This model 
called The Pitch Machine was able to sug­
gest, based on previous pitch sequences and 
locations, where and what pitch each active 
MLB pitcher should throw to a each active 
MLB batter in order to get a strike. The 
model was able to modify for any count, 
previous pitch thrown and many other fac­
tors. Using this model, teams would be able 
to help their pitchers deceive hitters and be­
come more effective.
When boiled down, moneyball is all 
about seeing beyond deception and creat­
ing more effective baseball teams for less 
money. This year’s Diamond Dollars Case 
Competition keyed in on this idea and al­
lowed the competitors to use new advanced 
data to see beyond the average box score 
and see how certain pitchers are using pitch 
tunneling to deceive hitters and be more ef­
fective than other pitchers of a similar cal­
iber.
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Letter From the President
As an undergraduate student organization dedicated educating and preparing its 
members, from across the entire university, for career opportunities in the sports industry, 
the Cornell ILR Sports Business Society is one of the premier student-run sports business 
organizations in the country. The club aims to reach this mission through the club’s four 
main platforms: speaker events, website blog, magazine, and radio program. This semester 
our club featured 13 executive board members and added a new research department. The 
club had a general body meeting every other week. This semester was highlighted by a 
debate about the Super Bowl and the role politics play in sports. This semester we also had 
a team represent Cornell and our club at the SABR Analytics Conference in the Diamond 
Dollars Case Competition in Phoenix, Arizona. A couple of club members also attended 
the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference. In the future, the club needs to increase it 
presence on all social media platforms, but especially in Linkedln. With a larger presence 
on Linkedln, we hope to increase communication between alumni and active members. 
We also hope to redesign our website over the summer.
Content production has been and continues to be one of the club’s main goals. I 
am happy to report that our blog is more active than ever before, featuring weekly blog­
ger roundtable discussions on our club website. Furthermore, our Sports Inc. magazine 
is produced on a bi-annual basis and features a wide range of stories about current sports 
topics. The SBS Report is produced every week and broadcasted through Cornell Radio. 
Finally, the club is grateful to all alumni and other professionals who have taken the time 
to visit campus or Skype with us throughout the semester. This semester we were lucky 
to have the likes of Andy Noel, FX Flinn, Chris Chaney, Peter Wilhelm, Marc Cornstein, 
and DeMaurice Smith. We are very fortunate that our alumni have been more than happy 
to be involved with the Sports Business Society as there is no better way to learn about 
the industry. With the diverse and extensive alumni network that is willing to support our 
group, we hope to add value to their own career advancement by connecting them with the 
rest of Cornell’s community.
The Cornell ILR Sports Business Society strives to serve both our student’s and 
alumni’s passion for sports business. Cornell is perhaps the most respected name within 
the Sports industry. The club hopes to continue and grow that reputation in the years to 
come.
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